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NOTES
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS UNDER FEDERAL
RULE 23: CONSUMER PROTECTION CAUSES OF
ACTION AVAILABLE UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
The Rule 23 class action is not a "cause of action" but rather
a procedural device through which multiple parties may join in
pursuing a single cause of action or multiple defendants may join
in defending against a single cause of action. While traditionally
the plaintiff class action has been primarily utilized in share-
holder and antitrust suits,' recent legislation and decisions re-
flecting public concern about consumer abuse have resulted in
increasing utilization of the class action by consumer-plaintiffs.
The consumer, for purposes of this note, is defined as the average
lower to middle class citizen who must purchase goods and serv-
ices for personal, family or household purposes.2 This consumer
is subject to the practices of the consumer trade industry and to
local laws protecting creditors. These practices and creditor laws
are the target of consumer class actions when there is a possible
violation of statutory or constitutional requirements.
Because the class action is a procedural question, the sub-
stantive requirements of the law suit must exist prior to any
determination of whether the class action may be maintained.
Consequently, the attorney attempting to pursue a consumer
class action must first determine whether an actionable claim
under federal law exists before attempting to meet the require-
ments of the Rule 23 class action procedure. For purposes of this
note, the analysis will be inverted to enable the reader to fully
appreciate the difficulties of adapting the Rule 23 class action to
1. See generally Proposed Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P., Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98-107 (1966) and the cases cited therein (hereinafter cited
Advisory Committee Notes).
2. This general definition of "consumer" has been adopted for use in recently pro-
posed federal legislation designed to specifically provide for consumer class actions. See
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the causes of action available to consumers under federal law.
First, there will be an orientation to the technical requirements
consumer class representatives must meet under Rule 23. The
second part of the note will survey some of the problems con-
fronted by consumer class representatives attempting to apply
the class action form to federal causes of action currently avail-
able for consumer protection. Cases and articles cited for author-
ity will be consumer oriented except where analogy to other types
of authority is appropriate or helpful.3
I. CLASS ACTIONS-RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Before treatment of specific consumer class actions may be
pursued, it is necessary to understand the background of the
current federal rule allowing class actions and how this rule is
designed to work. The following outline of Rule 23 is intended to
give the reader a basic understanding of the vital subsections of
Rule 23 and to show the general application of these subsections
to consumer class actions.
A. Purpose of the 1966 Revision of Rule 23
Prior to the 1966 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 23 was the subject of much confusion and controversy.4
The pre-1966 Rule 23 categorized classes into abstract class con-
cepts: "joint," "several" affecting specific property and "several"
with a common question of law or fact. In an attempt to simplify,
these categories were labeled as "true," "hybrid" and "spurious"
class actions. 5 Judicial efforts at clarification were far from effec-
tive-the tests being largely subjective with little in the opinions
3. There are two particularly helpful sources available which give an excellent intro.
duction to the consumer class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
an untitled collection of articles and notes in 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 497-632 (1969)
and the new ten volume federal practice treatise entitled, WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1972) [hereinafter cited WRIGHT & MILER].
4. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98-99 (1966). This is not to imply that the
new version of Rule 23 has been without confusion and controversy. The controversy over
the old rule was due to the difficulty in interpreting the rule, whereas the controversy over
the new rule concerns its application. Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Action: Surviv-
ing Difficulties and New Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REv. 509
(1968).
5. 7 WRIGHT AND MILLEa § 1752 (1972).
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giving any real guidance. The problems associated with the old
rule and the difficulties the courts encountered in formulating
clear guidelines demanded a major revision of Rule 23.
In 1966, Rule 23 was drastically overhauled. The basic pur-
pose of the overhaul was to draft the rule "in more practical
terms" than the prior rule to avoid problems of interpretation.'
Beyond this basic purpose, however, there are divergent theories
concerning a possible deeper, further reaching purpose in the re-
vision of Rule 23. One theory-the narrow view-is that the new
rule is designed to tighten guidelines for class actions so that
fewer class actions may be brought under the new rule. 7 This
narrow view draws support from (1) the original purpose of the
class action to eliminate multiple litigation and (2) the Advisory
Committee Notes concerning the 1966 Federal Rules revisions,
which indicate an overall policy of limiting the access to the
federal courts.
On the other hand, most commentators believe that the new
rule was designed to depart from the narrower purpose of the old
rule and set forth a new form of relief for "small claimants,"
otherwise unable to have their day in court.8 This theory-the
broad purpose view-while still being debated in the courts, ap-
pears to be the majority view. There is yet another theory-the
cautious view-which embraces a broader utilization of the class
action than the old rule, but only when the class action procedure
is clearly preferential and provided that the class action is effec-
tively manageable.' Otherwise, so the proponents of the cautious
6. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 99 (1966).
7. Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. IND. & COM.
L, REV. 515 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REv. 501 (1969).
9. "The amended rule is in jeopardy from those who embrace it too enthusiastically
just as it is from those who approach it with distaste or undue restrictiveness ....
[P]atience is essential. . . ." 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1753 (1972). See also Frankel, Some
Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967) and Frankel,
Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRusT L.J. 295, 299 (1966),
expressing the "cautious views" of District Judge Marvin E. Frankel; Kaplan, A Prefatory
Note, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 497 (1969), expressing the guarded optimism of
Professor Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the 1966 revision of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
[Some] are repelled by these massive, complex, unconventional lawsuits be-
cause they call for so much judicial initiative and management. We hear talk
that it all belongs not to the courts but to administrative agencies. But. . . I
do not myself see only subversion of the judicial process here but rather a fine
[Vol. 25
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view have warned, the class action will be abused and conse-
quently "fall into disrepute." The wisdom of the cautious view is
clear. Unfortunately, however, this view has not been widely ac-
cepted and the warnings have gone unheeded.
B. Requirements for Class Actions under the 1966 Rule 23
There are two phases of requirenients that must be met by
the representative parties under Rule 23. The first phase is found
in the list of prerequisites under Rule 23(a) which must exist in
all three forms of class actions. The second phase depends on the
category of class action sought to be maintained. When the prere-
quisites of Rule 23(a) and the requirements for the particular
category of class action are met, the representative party or par-
ties may proceed with the class action. Other subsections of Rule
23 are designed for the court to utilize in maintaining an orderly,
proper course after the class action is begun. It is important in
considering any of the Rule 23 requirements to bear in mind the
broad discretion allowed the court in determining whether a class
action is maintainable and if so, the extent to which the compo-
nent parts of the class action will be binding.
1. Rule 23(a): Prerequisites for All Categories of Class Actions
Rule 23(a) outlines the basic prerequisites to be met before
any of the Rule 23(b) categories of class action may be main-
tained.10 Although not specifically mentioned under Rule 23(a),
there must first exist a class defined in such terms that it will not
be difficult to determine who the class members are." Here the
court has broad discretion in redefining the class if necessary or
appropriate. After the existence of the class is established, the
representative party bringing the action in the name of the class
must establish his own membership in the alleged class.
12
After the establishment of the existence of the class and the
class membership of the representative, the representative party
opportunity for its accommodation to new challenges of the times. I am exhila-
rated, not despressed, by experimentation which spies out carefully the fullest
possibilities of the new Rule.
10. See Appendix infra for FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
11. 7 WRIGHT & MiLLER § 1760 (1972).
12. Id. at § 1761. Usually, a plea "on behalf of [the plaintiff-class representative]
and others similarly situated" is sufficient.
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must meet four requirements specifically enumerated in Rule
23(a). Of these four requirements, the first and the fourth are the
most important. Rule 23(a)(1) states the class must be too nu-
merous for joinder of all class members to be practicable. This
requirement necessarily implies that where joinder is practicable
under Rule 20,'1 the class action should not be maintained. It is
well established, however, that a test of "numerosity" alone is not
sufficient, there being other factors that may affect the practica-
bility of joinder.' 4 Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of questions
of law and fact common to all the class members. The rule pro-
vides no direction in determining how many "questions of law
and fact" must be "common." Yet, the courts have had little
difficulty in finding sufficient "commonality" of questions and
only a few cases treat this requirement in any detail.' 5 Rule
23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the representa-
tives must be typical of those of the whole class. The difficulty
in this requirement is apparent in its subjectivity. Cases attempt-
ing to articulate the meaning of the "typicality" requirement
have, for the most part, related it to the other requirements under
Rule 23, thereby evading an independent definition. 6 The fourth
and final enumerated requirement of Rule 23(a) requires that the
representative be able to fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the entire class he represents. This condition is partic-
ularly important in the Rule 23(b)(3) class action which has a
binding effect on all class members unless they opt out. If the
class is not fairly and adequately represented from the outset,
however, the class members under Rule 23(b)(3) may not be
bound by the outcome because of denial of due process.'
7
It is apparent that judicial discretion plays a vital role in
determining whether the requirements of Rule 23(a) have been
met. Determining the representative capacity of the party bring-
ing the action, the "numerosity" of the class with respect to the
impracticability of joinder, the "commonality" of the questions
of fact and law, the "typicality" of the claims or defenses and the
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 allows "permissive joinder" of all parties claiming relief
"jointly, severally or in the alternative . . . arising out of the same transaction. . . and
if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action."
14. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1762 (1972).
15. Id. at § 1763.
16. Id. at § 1764.
17. Id. at § 1765.
244 [Vol. 25
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ability of the representative fairly and adequately to represent
the class necessarily require broad judicial discretion since these
tests are largely subjective. To preclude an inordinantly strict
application of these requirements, Rule 23 contains special
"safety valves" in subsections (c), (d) and (e) which aid the court
in controlling the maintenance of the class action.18 These "safety
valves" add the needed flexibility for the proper utilization and
function of the class action. Although a detailed discussion of
these subsections is beyond the scope of this note, the attorney
pursuing a class action under Rule 23 should familiarize himself
with them to ease the administration of Rule 23.
The prerequisites required by Rule 23(a) apply to all class
actions. Therefore, there are no unique considerations necessary
for the application of Rule 23(a) to the consumer class action. The
class is usually quite large in a consumer class action and while
determination of impracticality of joinder is relatively simple,
determination of commonality of questions and fair and adequate
representation are often difficult. Indeed, the class size is implic-
itly becoming a dispositive factor in dismissal of consumer class
actions." Nevertheless, the practical considerations by the court
in determining whether the Rule 23(a) prerequisites exist should
be no more difficult in the consumer class action than in other
class actions.
2. Rule 23(b): Specific Requirements for the Three Separate
Categories of Class Actions
In addition to the requirements of Rule 23(a) there are addi-
tional conditions to be met dependent on the category of class
action brought. There are three categories, each having require-
ments exclusive of those related to the other two categories. These
three categories are: (1) actions which might adversely affect
other parties; (2) actions for equitable relief; and (3) actions with
predominant common questions and in which the class action
procedure is superior to other procedures. 0 Of the three, the last
18. See Appendix infra for FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), (d) and (e).
19. See, e.g., Krainin v. S. Klein Dep't. Stores, 345 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D. Kan., 1972); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
20. See Appendix infra for FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (2) and (3).
1973]
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is most commonly used for consumer class actions. Each cate-
gory, will be briefly discussed for background, clarification and
contrast.
a. Rule 23(b)(1) Class Actions: Adverse Effect Caused by
Separate Actions
The basic rationale behind the Rule 23(b)(1) class action is
that the class action procedure is deemed appropriate because of
the possible adverse effect of separate actions. Rule 23(b)(1) pro-
tects both the opponents of the alleged class and the class mem-
bers by allowing the class action: (1) when separate actions would
create incompatible standards for the parties opposing the class;
and (2) when separate action would act adversely or dispositively
upon the rights of class members not joined in the separate ac-
tions. The drafters of Rule 23(b)(1) class actions were anticipat-
ing situations in which numerous lawsuits concerning a single
controversy would be impending or imminent. Therefore, the rule
is designed to limit the caseload of the federal courts by consoli-
dation of duplicate actions.2'
The situations anticipated by the drafters of Rule 23(b)(1)
class actions are distinguishable from the situations from which
consumer class actions arise. Rarely are numerous separate suits
by consumers brought in federal courts. On the contrary, it is only
through the class action suit that the most effective action may
be brought in behalf of the members of this class. 22 Rule 23(b)(1)
is a shield for the courts, whereas the consumer class action is a
sword for the "small claimant." Accordingly, most courts and
commentators have distinguished Rule 23(b) (1) actions from con-
sumer class actions stating that the latter should be sought under
Rule 23(b)(3) .23 Nevertheless, some courts have allowed consumer
oriented class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b) (3).24 In
such situations, the courts have applied the more lenient notice
rules for Rule 23(b)(1) class actions instead of the more complex
21. Weithers, supra note 7.
22. 7A WImHT & MILLER § 1779 (1972).
23. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N. Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See
also, Katorincic and McClain, Federal Class Actions Under Rule 23: How to Improve the
Merits of Your Class Action Without Improving the Merits of Your Claim, 33 U. PITT. L.
REv. 429, 431 (1972).
24. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1772 (1972).
[Vol. 25
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Rule 23(b)(3) class action notice requirements.25 The courts al-
lowing the Rule 23(b)(1) consumer class action, however, are in
the minority and clearly the better procedure for the consumer
class representative is the Rule 23(b) (3) form. Therefore, the class
representative in the consumer class suit should prepare to meet
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
b. Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions: Equitible Relief
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) are limited to actions
wherein final injunctive or declaratory relief is sought by the class
representative. Specific requirements, in addition to the standard
prerequisites of Rule 23(a), are that the party opposing the class
bringing the action has consistently "acted or refused to act in a
manner generally applicable to the class" and that equitable rem-
edy is sought. The typical example of this class action is the civil
rights action seeking equitable relief.26 This category of class ac-
tion is not usually desirable for a consumer class action because
of a very practical reason: the remedy available is purely equita-
ble, and therefore monetary awards are rarely achievedY Few
parties will pursue a class action for only equitable remedies un-
less grave civil rights are in jeopardy. The most important consid-
eration for the prospective consumer class representative is
whether the class action procedure is necessary when all the
claimant seeks is equitable relief for himself and the class he
represents. A favorable judgment in a civil rights action may
protect the rights of all class members having a similar com-
plaint. In such event, the class action problems and expense may
not be necessary to achieve the desired result.2 As previously
stated, money damages will normally be an important goal of the
25. See Appendix infra and compare FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c)(2) with FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(3).
26. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
27. But see Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1970) where the court
allowed a civil rights class action to proceed for damages from denial of welfare payments.
See also Starrs, The Consumer Class Action Part I: Considerations in Equity, 49 Bos. U.
L. REv. (1969) wherein the author urges the use of the equity powers of the federal courts
to aid abused consumers.
28. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), where the court refused to allow the class
action procedure since a favorable decision for the plaintiffs would have applied to all the
class members in any event.
1973]
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representative party in a consumer class action and, if so, Rule
23(b)(3) should be utilized.
Perhaps it is wise to insert a caveat at this point in discussing
the civil rights class action to avoid misleading the reader. Al-
though the civil rights class action is normally thought of in the
context of Rule 23(b)(2), the civil rights claim may also be pur-
sued in other forms of class actions under Rule 23 when monetary
damages are sought in conjunction with equitable remedies. An
important use of the civil rights statutes for pursuing Rule
23(b)(3) consumer class actions seeking monetary damages will
be discussed in the second part of this note.
29
c. Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Predominant Common
Questions and Superior Action
The final category of class action is the "Predominant Ques-
tion/Superior Action" class action under Rule 23(b)(3). As pre-
viously noted, this is the most important category with respect to
class actions for consumer remedies. Under this category, pecuni-
ary damages may be awarded, adding both incentive and threat
elements to the class action. The possibility of pecuniary award
is a tremendous incentive for the representative parties, not to
mention attorneys representing them. However, this incentive
element has been a primary source of criticism of the consumer
class action since it may, and frequently does, lead to "bounty
hunting" by attorneys. 0 In addition to the incentive elements,
the availability of damages under Rule 23(b)(3) is a powerful
threat to the unscrupulous elements in the consumer trade indus-
try. Because of this threat element, many courts have been reluc-
tant to allow the consumer class action to proceed.31 However, by
applying the "cautious view" to Rule 23(b)(3), as recommended
by many commentators,32 there should be no reason why the
courts should not allow the consumer class representative to pro-
29. See part II. infra.
30. See, e.g., Katarincic and McClain, Federal Class Actions Under Rule 23: How to
Improve the Merits of Your Class Action Without Improving Your Claim, 33 U. Prrw. L.
REv. 429 (1972); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destructions, 55 F.R.D.
375 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134 (D. Kan. 1972) where the
court dismissed the class action in part because of the interrorem effect of the procedure
on the defendant.
32. See note 9 supra and text accompanying.
[Vol. 25
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ceed in a proper case, pecuniary damages notwithstanding. Such
a proper case would be one in which the class is "manageable"
and in which the nature, severity or magnitude of the grievance
indicates the class action is the best procedure available for re-
dress.
Of the three forms of class actions under Rule 23, the Rule
23(b)(3) class action is the most technical. The opening phrase,
"the court finds," clearly indicates the important function of ju-
dicial discretion in applying this rule. The court, in its broad
discretion, must find that the common questions required by
Rule 23(a), predominate over questions affecting only individual
class members. Additionally, the court in its discretion must find
the class action procedure superior to any other procedure the
class may have individually or jointly pursued. To aid the court
in.determining whether these requirements have been met, Rule
23(b) (3) sets out a non-exclusive list of four "pertinent matters"
for consideration. Roughly restated, these considerations are
whether the individual members of the class would better have
their interests protected by separate actions, whether litigation
on the subject matter has already commenced in other courts,
whether the forum selected is the proper or best forum, and
whether the class action is "manageable."
The "predominant question" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)
was intended by the drafters to limit the scope of the class action
and narrow a class to allow the class representative to properly
represent it. Pursuant to that purpose, the court has discretion
to utilize the "safety valves" in Rule 23(c) for the elimination of
corollary issues, thus tailoring the class to the predominant ques-
tions presented.3 3 The court may even create sub-classes, if neces-
sary, and allow determinations of some predominant questions to0
apply to only part of the original class. While the problem of
determining the predominance of the questions of law and fact
has frequently been a preplexing one, the problem can usually be
resolved by applying the "common nucleus of the operative facts"
test.3
4
The "superiority" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), like the
"predominant question" requirement, is a device for limiting the
class action. The limitation is not on the applicability of the class
33. 7A WRIGTr & MIL.R § 1777 (1972).
34. Id. at § 1778.
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action.to the question presented, but on the very use of the class
action procedure. If the court finds another form of procedure is
better suited for* the parties or dispute involved, the court may
disrriiss the class action. In the normal consumer action the con-
sumer will hardly seek separate action and joinder is usually
practical; therefore, the use of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action ap-
pears to be not only the superior procedure but the only practica-
ble procedure available for redress. 5 If the court applies this
practical viewpoint, the typical consumer class action should
meet the test of superiority. There is, of course, the important
question of the "manageability" of the class action-one of the
"pertinent matters" specifically listed in Rule 23(b)(3) for consid-
eration. When the consumer class is deemed unmanageable by
the court, the action may be dismissed regardless of the merits
of the class action.
3
6
The requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are broadly phrased as a
device of the drafters to give the courts great leeway in determin-
ing whether the class action can or should be maintained. How-
ever, this device gives little guidance to the parties seeking to
pursue a remedy via the Rule 23(b)(3) class action category. The
only real, practical guidance in the rule is implied: find a sympa-
thetic court willing to prod the class action through to its end.
Without a sympathetic court, the Rule 23(b) (3) class action may
never get past Rule 23(c) (1).3 Hopefully, much of the difficulty
in interpreting Rule 23(b)(3) will diminish as precedents harden
into rules which will guide both the representative party and the
court.
(i) Rule 23(c)(2): Notification Requirements for Rule 23(b)(3)
Class Actions
In addition to the aforementioned problems in establishing
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, there may exist special problems
regarding class notification. Without fully considering the prob-
lems of notice and the coexisting question of due process in Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, it is important to point out that Rule
35. Id. at § 1779. But see Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), where the court ruled that adequate statutory remedies displace the need
for class actions. This new development is discussed in greater detail infra.
36. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1780 (1972).
37. See Appendix infra for FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
[Vol. 25
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23(c)(2) requires the court to notify all Rule 23(b)(3) class mem-
bers of the impending action by the "best notice practicable
under the circumstances. ' 38 Rule 23(c)(2) further requires that
this notice must advise the class member he must request exclu-
sion from the class by a specified date or he will be bound by any
judgment, including costs if the class action fails; and finally that
any class member desiring personal representation may be repre-
sented by his own counsel in the class action.
Administering the requirements of notice under Rule
23(c) (2) may prove to be the biggest obstacle the class representa-
tive and the court will face in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. Conse-
quently this may encourage the court to find reasons to dismiss
the class action as unmanageable under Rule 23(d) (1).31 The Rule
23(c)(2) requirement that notice be given only in "the best man-
ner practicable" should be, however, a sufficient "safety valve"
by which the court can effectuate notice and allow the action to
be maintained. Although the responsibility for notifying the
members of the class rests with the court, the representative
party should devise alternative methods of notification for the
court to utilize.
The "opt out" feature of the Rule 23(c) (2) notice requirement
is perhaps the most innovative and drastic change from the old
rules. The old Rule 23 excluded class members who did not specif-
ically request to be included in the class. The revised rule pro-
vides that the Rule 23(b) (3) class will be all inclusive of identified
members unless the members request exclusion. Therefore, Rule
23(b)(3) class action judgments will be res judicata as to all class
members not opting out, unless class members seeking subse-
quent judgments can successfully attack the notice provided by
the court presiding over the class action. To preclude later adjudi-
cation of the notice requirement by a dissident class member, the
court initiating notice should endeavor to be as thorough as prac-
ticable in notifying all class members and allow adequate time for
class members to request exclusion.
38. Id.
39. But see WmIGrr & MILLER § 1780 (1972) wherein the courts are encouraged to
avoid evasion of judicial responsibility by making earnest efforts to carry out the design
of the class action procedure.
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II. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN BRINGING AND MAINTAINING
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL STATUTES
The first part of this note discussed the provisions of Rule 23,
emphasizing the requirements to be met, frequently analyzing
the rule's applicability to the consumer class action. This part of
the note will attempt to address other, more specific problems
concerning the utility of the class action by the consumer-
plaintiff, emphasizing recent developments. Problems of obtain-
ing federal jurisdiction and problems in meeting related, and in-
creasingly stringent, requirements of Rule 23 consumer class ac-
tions will be discussed.
The analyst of Rule 23 will detect a growing trend away from
the early, optimistic aspirations for the rule toward narrow appli-
cations of the rule. Although this negative trend is in its infancy
and rides a crest of consumer class litigation, the trend is showing
signs that it may grow into the rule. The early warnings issued
by Kaplan, Frankel, and Wright that abuse of Rule 23 would
decrease its respect and utility have unfortunately been un-
heeded."0 War on the consumer class action is beginning to erupt
in the courts and in the commentaries because of the "wretched
abuse" of the rule from the bar, confusion and dismay at the
bench, and the general failure of the rule to give any real compen-
sation to the consumer. Although the signs of terminal illness
may be beginning to show, Rule 23 consumer class actions never-
theless remain a powerful tool for consumers when properly
utilized and are an awesome threat to class action defendants.
Since Rule 23 can not confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts, the consumer class representative must find a basis for
federal jurisdiction in order to proceed with a consumer class
action under Rule 23. There are many statutes granting federal
jurisdiction, but most litigants obtain federal jurisdiction by al-
leging that a "federal question" is in issue4" or by alleging "diver-
sity of citizenship" between plaintiff and defendant.2 Because
federal question and diversity jurisdiction both require that the
amount in controversy exceed $10,000, special problems exist for
the "small claimant"-consumer class action.
40. See note 9 supra.
41. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1966).
42. Id. at § 1332.
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While other requirements for federal jurisdiction must be
met, such as justiciability, standing, and ripeness, they will not
be discussed. Some of these requirements are impliedly incorpo-
rated into Rule 23. Requirements not incorporated into the class
action rule must be met, as in any suit in federal court, or juris-
diction will be denied.
In order to fully appreciate some of the basic problems con-
cerning the utilization of the various federal statutes granting
federal jurisdiction and the courts' application of these federal
laws to the consumer class action, threshold policy questions
should be considered: Should "small claim" litigants have the
authority to act as "private attorneys general" by bringing class
actions against vital segments of the national commercial indus-
try in order to prevent consumer abuse, or should control and
regulation of the commercial sector be solely accomplished by
governmental agencies?
The best demonstration of this threshold policy conflict is
reflected in the current effort to have a special consumer class
action bill passed by Congress. The Administration bill provides
for private action only after action has been brought by the attor-
ney general for a consumer abuse violation, an injunction has
been issued and the defendant has violated the injunction.43 This
three step approach clearly illustrates one view that priviate liti-
gation is not the preferred course for controlling commercial ac-
tivity. On the other hand, there are numerous similar bills pro-
posed in Congress which allow direct private action. The Magnu-
son" and Bayh45 proposals are representative, each allowing the
class action to proceed immediately after the original violation.
Although no affirmative action has been taken on any of these
bills to date, there is increasing pressure for action and a compro-
mise bill will probably be passed. It is difficult to predict which
view will predominate. Until such a bill is passed, the consumer
class litigant must find avenues in existing federal statutes for
entry into the federal courts.
A. Jurisdictional Amount: The Snyder Aggregation Prohibition
Prior to 1966, the federal courts had adopted a special rule
43. S. 1222, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
44. S. 984, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
45. S. 1378, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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with respect to computation of jurisdictional amount required for
federal jurisdiction. The rule stated that parties to a joint action
could not aggregate or accumulate their separate claims in order
to arrive at the requisite amount, regardless of the similarity of
their claims except under strict, technical circumstances. Many
commentators and many courts believed the new Rule 23 had
eradicated the aggregation prohibition because the "spirit" of the
new rule was to allow "small claimants" to have their day in
court.46 Much to the dismay of many writers, however, in 1969 the
Supreme Court in Snyder v. Harris4" precluded accumulation of
damages by "small claimants" to meet jurisdictional amount re-
quirements.
One of the two conflicting lower court cases from which the
Snyder decision arose was Gas Service Co. v. Coburn. In Coburn
the class representative was a consumer who alleged a gas distrib-
utor had illegally overcharged the class of 18,000 consumers. Fed-
eral jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, necessitat-
ing a claim of the usual $10,000 jurisdictional amount. The class
representative's personal damages amounted to a meager $7.81,
but the lower court allowed jurisdictional amount computation
by aggregating all 18,000 claims, easily exceeding the $10,000
required. The lower court, in allowing aggregation, stated that
Coburn was an "ideal class action." The Snyder court was unim-
pressed.
The Snyder court held that the amount in controversy can
not be aggregated unless the cause of action alleged in behalf of
the class is "joint and common" to the whole class, as opposed
to "separate and distinct" claims. Ironically, it was Justice
Black, an original critic of the new Rule 23 for its susceptability
to judicial discretion," who wrote the Synder opinion, requiring
the application of the highly subjective "joint/common-
separate/distinct" dichotomy. Addressing himself to the 1966
revision of Rule 23 in his Snyder opinion, Justice Black con-
cluded that the new rule could not have changed the tradi-
tional requirements for determination of jurisdictional amount.
While the Snyder court denied a return to the application of the
46. See, e.g., Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of
Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 601 (1969).
47. 394 U.S. 332 (1989).
48. 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
49. Order Adopting Amendments to FED. R. Crv. P., 383 U.S. 1031, 1032 (1966)
(dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
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narrow pre-1966 class action interpretations, 0 the implication
was undeniable: the court had rejected the new Rule 23 as a
panacea for "small claimants."
The restrictive view of Snyder has been widely criticized for
its return to the vague and impractical standards rejected by the
drafters of the new Rule 23.51 Requiring all claims to meet the
ambiguous "joint and common" test in effect denies "small
claimants" their most likely avenue into the federal
courts-diversity jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is not likely that
the Supreme Court will overrule Snyder because (1) Snyder
stands for the strongly defended Supreme Court policy of limiting
federal jurisdiction and (2) the number of class actions filed is
extremely high despite the Snyder limitation. There is fear that
without the Snyder prohibition on aggregation, the federal courts,
through the "diversity of citizenship" statute, will be engulfed by
"state cases" or controversies of a purely local nature.
Does Snyder prohibit all "small claimant" class actions? An
affirmative answer to this question in 1969, after the Snyder deci-
sion, would have required a naive discounting of the ingenuity of
that "valiant and ever faithful 'small claimant' watchdog"-the
local plaintiff's attorney. Numerous methods have been "discov-
ered" (or created) in order to get the class action into federal
court. One approach has been a direct assault on the Snyder
mandate by trying to find technical loopholes in the aggregation
prohibition.
A recent, but futile, diversity of citizenship class action in-
volved an attempt by the class representative to meet the juris-
dictional amount for the whole class based on his claim alone,
since none of the absent class members had a $10,000 claim." The
district court, however, held that Snyder implicitly requires each
class member to have a $10,000 claim, a decision which certainly
prevents "run of the mill" consumers from crowding the federal
dockets. A more successful attack on Snyder has been the finding
of a "trust fund" in which the class members have sufficient
"integrated interest" to allow aggregation, although the claims
are not technically "joint." Isolated cases involving race horse
owners as a class, suing race track owners for failure to pay money
50. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
51. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDEAL COURTS § 36, at 122 (1970).
52. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
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under a purse contract,53 and employees as a class suing an em-
ployer for failure to pay shares under a profit sharing pension
plan" have allowed "trust fund" aggregation. The subjective test
for such aggregation, however, is hardly a practical one under
which a litigant can safely proceed. A much less sophisticated
attempt to avoid Snyder is recommended by one successful plain-
tiff's attorney who unabashedly recommends the simple solution
of increasing pecuniary damage allegations.55
B. Federal Statutes and Doctrines Granting Jurisdiction
Without Regard to Amount in Controversy
In the wake of Snyder, the best manner to proceed with a
consumer class action is to locate a federal statute granting fed-
eral jurisdiction without requiring the higher jurisdictional
amount requirement. There are numerous federal statutes grant-
ing federal jurisdiction without regard to amount, but most have
such a highly specialized purpose that they cannot be adapted to
a consumer class action. 6 A few federal statutes do specifically
allow or have been construed to allow private civil action for
consumer abuse. Remedies available under these statutes vary
from equitable relief to punitive damages. The type remedy
sought is gaining in importance in determining whether the con-
sumer class action may be maintained: class actions seeking large
pecuniary damages are being looked upon with increasing disfa-
vor by the courts.
Federal laws under which consumer class actions have been
brought include antitrust laws, securities fraud laws, civil rights
laws and consumer credit protection laws. In addition to these
major statutes, several other methods have been utilized by con-
sumer class litigants to gain entry into the federal courts. The
following discussion will survey the causes of action currently
available to consumer litigants, which may be pursued under
federal laws and judicial doctrines granting federal jurisdiction
over the action.
53. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n., 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969).
54. Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969).
55. Ashe, The Class Action: Solution for the Seventies, 7 N. ENG. L. Rav. 1 (1971).
56. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 32, at 10a (1970) which gives a








Perhaps the most important statute granting federal juris-
diction without regard to amount in controversy in consumer
class actions is found under Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust
Act which states in part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue ther-
efor in any district court of the United States in the district
where the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages . . . and cost . . . including reasonable attorney's
fees.5 1
While the "treble damage statute" was clearly designed to be
used by businessmen against businessmen for unlawful monopo-
lies, combinations, conspiracies and price fixing, 8 the statute was
broad enough in terms-"any person" and "injury in his prop-
erty"-to allow a suit by anyone proving an antitrust violation
and consequential damages. As early as 1906 the Supreme Court
stated that "injured in his property" means, among other things,
being led to pay more for something than it is worth. Therefore,
the stage was set at an early date for the consumer antitrust suit.
Prior to 1966, private actions under the antitrust laws were
rare since the cost of separate lawsuits by small claimants was
prohibitive. Since then, however, numerous consumer class anti-
trust suits have been filed under the revised Rule 23.60 The lead-
ing examples of such an action is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin!,
In Eisen, the class action was brought by a consumer-
investor on behalf of 3,700,000 class members for treble damages
from an alleged conspiracy by defendants to fix the commissions
on certain securities transactions. The claims of the class repre-
57. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1964) (emphasis added). See generally Newberg, Federal Con-
sumer Class Action Legislation: Making the System Work, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 217, 218
(1972).
58. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-14 (1964) which describe the conduct for which private
action may be pursued under 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1964).
59. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
60. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Colo. 1967), (allowing
the class action procedure), aff'd 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Note, Consumers
and Antitrust Treble Damages: Credit-Furniture Tie-ins in the Low Income Market, 79
YALE L.J. 254 (1969).
61. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
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sentative only amounted to $70.00. The lower court in Eisen dis-
missed the class action, finding the lack of intervention by other
class members to be proof of the absence of a predominance of
common questions.2 The court of appeals reversed, stating that
Rule 23(b)(3) was drafted to aid "small claimants" and that the
facts in the case presented a proper situation for the class action
procedure.1
3
The Eisen decision is primarily praised as the landmark case
judicially establishing the "small claimant" purpose of the re-
vised Rule 23. It points up, however, many of the weaknesses of
the new Rule 23 and the controversy surrounding class actions.
Although the Eisen class action was begun in 1966, it has yet to
be completed even though many separate opinions on various
issues have been filed. 4 Problems in the management of large
classes, as in Eisen, have caused delays and technical difficulties.
Compounding the chagrin of the opponents of class actions is that
the estimated treble damages for each of the 3,700,000 class mem-
bers in Eisen will only amount to $3.90.65 There are also practical
difficulties involved in antitrust class actions because of the ne-
cessity of proving the elements of liability for the antitrust viola-
tion." Normally the elements of antitrust suits include a violation
of an antitrust statute, causal connection between the violation
and the plaintiff's claim, and proof of damages. In the class action
62. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
63. 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968). But see, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41
U.S.L.W. 2586 (2d Cir. May 1, 1973) wherein the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
missed the Eisen class action because of the refusal of the class representative to pay the
costs of actual notification of 2,250,000 class members, whose identification was reasona-
bly ascertainable. This case contains strong language condemning the use of the Rule 23
class action by large consumer classes and represents one more giant judicial step in the
direction away from the "small claims" purpose of the class action procedure. This latest
Eisen case was reported only weeks before the final proofs of this note were sent to press
and therefore is not reflected in the text.
64. 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (further information required of both parties be-
fore a determination of class manageability and notice requirements); 52 F.R.D. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Class action maintainable, preliminary hearing called to apportion
costs); 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (plaintiff likely to prevail, therefore, defendant to
bear 90% of notice costs); rev'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 2586 (2d Cir. May 1, 1973) (class action
dismissed where class representative refuses to pay costs for actual notification of all class
members who are reasonably identifiable). See also Comment, Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacque-
lin: "Frankenstein Monster Posing as a Class Action?" 33 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 868 (1972).
65. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 379
(1972).
66. Id. at 382; Note, Consumers and Antitrust Treble Damages: Credit-Furniture
Tie-ins in the Low Income Market, 79 YALE L.J. 254 (1969).
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there are numerous choices concerning the development of the
elements of the antitrust case. For example, the court may: (1)
dismiss the class action for lack of manageability in establishing
proof of causal connection and consequential damages; (2) allow
the class action to proceed, but only for the determination of the
antitrust violation, requiring each claimant individually prove
his own right to damages; or (3) eliminate the element of causal
connection, creating strict liability for any antitrust violation.
The Eisen court held that the trial on the class action issue could
determine all the damages to the class and divide the damages
among the class at a later time. 7
Critics point out that the antitrust lawsuit is distorted when
separate trials are required to prove separate elements of the
claim. Naturally, the pro-business critics decry the creation of per
se liability of defendants to a large class of litigants. There are
also fears that an unfavorable class action "backlash" may even-
tually sound the end of the traditional antitrust suit, unless the
courts can logically distinguish "antitrust" from "consumer pro-
tection" litigation.1
8
Alternatively, advocates of the consumer class antitrust suit
point out the abuses consumers suffer and the need for relief.
While the estimated attorney's fees in Eisen are projected to be
$5,000,000, the supporters of the consumer class action claim that
such fees will enhance the utility of the rule and therefore in-
crease its effectiveness in curbing consumer abuse. 9 These exces-
sive fees, however, sometimes lead to the "bounty hunting" expe-
dition which is said by some to be the most serious fault with the
consumer class action.
7
Two special developments have emerged in the consumer
class antitrust suits that deserve particular attention. The first is
the application of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute7' to the
consumer class action field. This statute permits consolidation of
67. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 566 (2d Cir. 1968).
68. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff's Viewpoint), 55
F.R.D. 365, 366-67 (1972).
69. Ashe, The Class Action: Solution for the Seventies, 7 N. ENG. L. REv. 1 (1971).
70. Katarincic and McClain, Federal Class Action Under Rule 23: How to Improve
the Merits of Your Class Action Without Improving Your Claim, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 429
(1972); Newberg, Federal Consumer Class Action Legislation: Making the System Work,
9 HAuv. J. LEGIS. 217 (1972); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction,
55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
71. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (Supp. 1972).
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related actions brought in more than one federal district court,
for the purpose of determining common issues. The various ac-
tions, when consolidated, are brought into one convenient federal
forum and a panel is assembled to decide which issues are com-
mon. Frequently, determination of these common issues is dispo-
sitive of the cases, greatly reducing the number of federal cases.
The second important development in the field of consumer class
litigation is the use of the Rule 23 class action by state and local
governments to protect their constituents from consumer abuse. 2
Generally, the state attorney general's office files the class action
in behalf of its citizens, proceeding thereafter in the same manner
as any other class action representative. These two developments
in class actions have been demonstrated in a most dramatic way
by a series of recent cases involving class suits against pharma-
ceutical companies for conspiracy and fraud in violation of anti-
trust laws.73
The pharmaceutical cases followed an attempt by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to prosecute several pharmaceutical com-
panies for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
74
Since the F.T.C. Act does not provide for private action, con-
sumer groups sought damages from the pharmaceutical compa-
nies in the form of antitrust class actions. So many suits were
filed that the parties invoked the Multidistrict Litigation Statute
to decide the common issues in all the suits. Without a full dis-
cussion of every rampart of the pharmaceutical decisions, a brief
overview of the nature of the various classes involved and some
of the basic determinations by the court in these decisions will be
enlightening in considering the current utility of class action pro-
cedure in consumer protection litigation.
Parties in the pharmaceutical cases have included: (1) gov-
ernmental entities, including states, counties, and cities, at-
tempting to represent individual consumer and commercial con-
stituents within their jurisdiction, and others similarly situated;
72. See, e.g., Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
73. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) which contains ten written orders concerning the maintenance
of actions by numerous plaintiffs and class representatives.
74. Id. at 317, wherein the court reviewed the Federal Trade Commission's action
against the defendants which was subsequently reversed on appeal. American Cyanamid
Co. v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
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(2) commercial entities, including wholesalers and retailers of the
pharmaceutical products involved in the antitrust dispute, at-
tempting to represent themselves and other, similar commercial
entities nationwide; (3) public entities, including hospitals, at-
tempting to represent themselves and other similar public enti-
ties nationwide; (4) consumers, attempting to represent them-
selves and other consumers nationwide; and (5) miscellaneous
parties, including the United States and foreign countries. 7 Com-
mon questions for determination have included: the definition of
the various classes, the capacity of the representatives and their
ability to fairly and adequately represent the class, commonality
of questions and superiority of the class action procedure. Need-
less to say, the problems faced by the court in making even the
most general recommendations for procedure are stupendous.
Representative of the problems posed in the pharmaceutical
cases is a recent, related series of cases brought against pharma-
ceutical companies for other alleged antitrust violations. In re
Ampicillin involved forty-six separate actions all moved into the
District Court for the District of Columbia under the Multidis-
trict Litigation Statute for preliminary determinations.7 1 Of the
forty-six actions, forty were class actions of nearly every descrip-
tion. The Ampicillin court established several basic criteria to be
met before these various class actions could proceed. The defen-
dants attempted to have the class actions dismissed for failure of
the class action to be the superior form of procedure, for lack of
"commonality" of interests and claims among the separate
classes, and because the claims were without merit. The
Ampicillin court, however, found that the class action procedure
was superior to other procedures and refused to look to the merits
of the claims at this preliminary stage. The court reaffirmed the
right of a governmental entity to represent, in class actions, lesser
entities and citizens located within its jurisdiction. Most impor-
tantly, the court denied the right of a governmental entity to
proceed as a class representative in behalf of individuals and
entities located without its own jurisdiction. From this restriction
on the scope of the class suit brought by governmental entities
staffed with many public attorneys, the court deduced that indi-
75. See generally In re Ambiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267-324 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
76. 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972).
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vidual consumer class representatives could not fairly and ade-
quately represent a "national class" of consumers similarly situ-
ated. The court came to a different result, however, when the
class representative was a commercial or public entity attempt-
ing to represent similar entities. The court held that although
these latter classes may often be unwieldy the class members
were easily identifiable and the class would be manageable.
While the Ampicillin court has apparently closed the door on
a true "national consumer class action," it has certainly paved
the way for class action by state governmental entities. Claims
by individual consumers within a defined area may still be pur-
sued as class actions under the Ampicillin rules, but attorneys for
states, counties and cities are considered better able to "fairly
and adequately" represent the consumer class. Clearly, the
Ampicillin rules would eliminate much of the "bounty-hunting"
criticism of private consumer class actions. The pharmaceutical
cases represent an attack on consumer abuse by large, nationwide
businesses, when much consumer abuse is carried on by lesser,
local businesses." Consequently, there are many local consumer
abuses suitable for antitrust class action remedy since antitrust
law may reach intrastate as well as interstate monopolistic prac-
tices. Absent effective, prompt action by the local government,
the antitrust class action by the private consumer should be ac-
ceptable, even under the Ampicillin rules.
In summary, the consumer class representative in the anti-
trust class action should be prepared to show the probable exist-
ence of an antitrust violation and probable existence of conse-
quential damage to himself and the class he represents. After
establishing these factors, the class representative must meet the
full requirements of Rule 23. Having established the probability
of the antitrust damages and the superiority of the class action
procedure, including adequate representation and manageability
of the class, the case may then proceed to a determination on the
merits. Because the antitrust suit is so firmly established as a
primary tool for guarding against restraints of trade by conspira-
cies to monopolize, the courts are hard pressed to deny the class
77. Cf. Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971) ("loansharking" held to effect interstate
commerce, although local in nature). See also Note, Consumers and Antitrust Treble
Damages: Credit-Furniture Tie-ins in the Low Income Market, 79 YALE L.J. 254 (1969).
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Although securities fraud is not normally considered a con-
sumer abuse, it is important to discuss this area of federal law
with respect to the impact of the new Rule 23 in class litigation,
because the problems raised in the securities fraud class action
cases are closely analogous to the problems raised in other con-
sumer class actions. Small investors, like consumers, are "small
claimants" and are dependent upon the Rule 23 class action for
remedy. Moreover, the development of statutory fraud in class
litigation, reflected in the securities fraud class suits, may prove
to be important persuasive authority in the event Congress passes
legislation to combat consumer fraud.
There are several categories of federal securities regulation
laws, all of which have been construed to grant jurisdiction with-
out regard to amount in controversy. 79 The primary securities
fraud statutes are the Securities Act of 1933, which regulates
initial distribution of securities," and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which regulates trading of securities after the initial
distribution. These two statutes have been the most prolific
sources of securities fraud litigation.
Traditionally, the class action suit has been recognized as the
primary device for enforcement of the federal securities statutes. 2
The pre-1966 Rule 23 provided for two types of shareholder class
suits: the traditional class suit, and the "shareholder derivative"
suit, which was a suit by shareholders to enforce a corporate right
in favor of the corporation instead of in favor of the shareholder
class. The 1966 revision of the Federal Rules removed the "share-
holder derivative" action from Rule 23 and created a separate
rule for this purpose. 3 This change, however, did not affect the
78. See, e.g., Summary and Analysis, 41 U.S.L.W. 1022 (Aug. 8, 1972) commenting
on the continuing vitality of antitrust enforcement by the Supreme Court.
79. L. Loss, SECURITms REGULATION at 2005 (temp. stud. ed. 1961). Although the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not specifically grant a federal civil action, it has
been the source of much private class action litigation.
80. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a (1971).
81. Id. at § 78b.
82. L. Loss, supra note 79, at 1819.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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shareholder class action for monetary and equitable remedies
under Rule 23.
The 1966 revision has, as previously pointed out, put new
teeth into Rule 23, giving class actions greater impact. Therefore,
the new Rule 23 class action is more attractive now for use by
small claim shareholders to guard against fraudulent practices by
corporate officers, corporate directors, and traders in securities.
This new impetus has, however, altered the traditional elements
required in the securities fraud lawsuit.
Statutory fraud is based on common law fraud and has re-
tained many of the common law rules for determining liability.
At common law, fraud contained six elements: "There must be
(1) a false representation of (2) a material (3) fact; . . . (4)
[intent to deceive by the vendor or] scienter . . . ; (5) the plain-
tiff must justifiably rely on [the false representation] and (6)
suffer damage as a consequence."84 The courts, in interpreting the
securities fraud statutes, have gradually eliminated the more
technical requirements of common law fraud, leaving three basic
requirements: misrepresentation, reliance or causation, and dam-
ages. 5 These basic requirements create unique problems in the
class action lawsuits because of the inherent difficulties in prov-
ing reliance and damages when dealing with a large class of liti-
gants.
Should the courts dismiss class actions because of the inabil-
ity of the class representative to establish proof of reliance and
consequential damages for the entire class? The Advisory Com-
mittee's Note on the new rule recognized this problem and stated
as follows:
[F]raud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class
action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is
found, for separate determination of the damages .... On the
other hand, . . . a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as
a class action if there was a material variation in the representa-
tions made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance . . ..
84. L. Loss, supra note 79, at 1431.
85. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Simon, Class
Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 381 (1972).
86. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966) (emphasis added).
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Despite the Advisory Committee's alternative of separate
trials on the elements of fraud, the cases are split on whether the
class action may proceed without first showing at least a proba-
bility of success in proving all the elements of statutory fraud.
While at least one court has held that the variance of reliance
among the class was unimportant, 7 virtually eliminating the reli-
ance element from the class representative's case, commentators
have feared that such a course will lead to "per se" liability.88 The
critics point out that, even when separate hearings on reliance
and damages are required, the resulting prejudice of the initial
finding of the statutory violation will render the defendant vir-
tually helpless.
While the foregoing considerations of the problems related to
the theory of statutory fraud, when applied to class actions, do
not currently have great significance in "pure" consumer class
actions, they may yet have a great significance in consumer litiga-
tion. Consumer fraud, the worst consumer abuse of all, includes
false advertising, deceptive business practices and numerous
other consumer misrepresentations. Unfortunately, none of these
consumer abuses can currently be remedied by private action in
the federal courts, and few states offer more than consolation to
their consumer constituents.8 9 If new federal legislation is passed
allowing civil remedies for these consumer abuses, the securities
fraud class action precedents will be quite useful to the courts and
consumer class action litigants.
Apart from the strictly theoretical consideration, the securi-
ties fraud class suits have made important contributions in the
development of class action guidelines. The leading securities
fraud class action is Green v. Wolf Corp. in which a United States
court of appeals recognized and accepted the utilization of Rule
23 class actions as an appropriate device for a class of small claim
shareholders." In Green, the shareholder class consisted of more
than 2,000 members, seeking actual and punitive damages for the
issuance of three allegedly fraudulent prospectuses produced by
the defendants. The lower court dismissed the class action, but
87. Esplin v. Hirchi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
88. See, e.g., Note, Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 337
(1971).
89. See note 149 infra and the text accompanying.
90. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
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the court of appeals reversed, finding all the basic requisites for
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action present.
In a carefully prepared opinion, given the background and
necessity for the class action in securities fraud cases, the Green
court made step by step determinations of whether each require-
ment of Rule 23 had been met. On the issue of commonality of
questions, the court found that the alleged misrepresentation in
the prospectuses was a common question of the whole class and
could be decided at once in the course of the class action proce-
dure. While deciding that the common questions presented pre-
dominated over individual issues of reliance, the court left open
to the lower court the question of whether to order separate trials
on reliance and damages in the event the class representative
proved the statutory violation. On the issue of "superiority," the
court displayed its generous attitude concerning Rule 23, holding
that the class action was the best remedy available, since none
of the other class members was "injured seriously enough to moti-
vate a solely individual action."'" Finally, the court ruled against
an allowance of punitive damages, in keeping with established
doctrine in securities fraud cases.
Green has been widely cited for its liberal application of Rule
23 class action procedural requirements in securities fraud viola-
tions. Liberal application of Rule 23 in favor of the class in the
early stages of litigation - and recognition of the "small claimant"
ideals of the Rule 23 drafters,93 are two of the Green court class
action principles which appear in many cases allowing mainte-
nance of class actions. No cases have been found explicitly refus-
ing to follow the Green court's application of Rule 23, although
some courts have limited Green to its particular facts.
Another case involving a securities fraud class action is
Dolgow v. Anderson.4 Because of its requirement of a finding of
"probable success on the merits" before the class can proceed,
Dolgow is one of the most widely discussed and most controversial
of all class actions. Dolgow involved a large class of many thou-
sands of stockholders seeking damages for an alleged attempt by
a corporation and its directors to inflate the selling price of the
91. Id. at 301.
92. Id. at 298.
93. Id. at 295.
94. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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corporation's stock. The lower court, in a meticulously outlined
and comprehensive opinion discussing the need for and desirabil-
ity of class actions for enforcement of securities regulations,
called for a preliminary hearing in which the class representatives
were required to establish a possibility of success on the merits
of their cause of action." At this hearing the lower court granted
a summary judgment for defendants. Upon appeal by the class
representatives, the court of appeals reversed, based on its belief
that the summary judgment was granted without due cause. 6
Upon remand, the district court [in an opinion hereafter referred
to as Dolgow II1] again dismissed the class action for the same
reasons it had originally used.97
The Dolgow I court reaffirmed its original basis of dismissal
explaining the necessity of the class litigant to show, preliminar-
ily, that the class action procedure was necessary due to the spe-
cial problems involved in large class actions. The court had taken
extensive testimony from the class representatives in the prelimi-
nary hearing, and from this information it had determined that
the class action was without merit. Therefore, the class action
was dismissed since: (1) the class representatives each had a suf-
ficiently large claim to seek an individual remedy; (2) notification
of all class members would require undue trouble and cost to
defendants; and (3) the class representatives had failed to show
a "substantial possibility" of succeeding with their claim. Pur-
suant to the instructions of the circuit court, the court in Dolgow
III extensively outlined the data presented at the preliminary
hearing, which the court held as substantiating the summary
judgment.
The Dolgow HI case has been criticized as an unwarranted
restriction of Rule 23.91 The requirement of a preliminary hearing
where the class representative must show "substantial possibility
of success" before the class action can proceed has the effect of a
"prejudgment judgment," which purists abhor. On the other
hand, Dolgow HI is not without ardent supporters who point out
95. Id.
96. 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
97. 53 F.R.D 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
98. See, e.g., Mersey v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 U.S.L.W. 2586 (2d Cir. May 1, 1973) wherein the court
soundly criticized the "minihearing" approach of the Dolgow cases for its abuse of the
Rule 23 "mandate" to notify class members prior to proceedings on the merits.
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such practical benefits of the preliminary hearing as the elimina-
tion of unnecessary costs and excessive deliberations. 9 Although
the full importance of Dolgow III is yet to be known, Rule 23 is
laden with judicial discretion, and it would seem to be a safe
prediction that the preliminary hearing will be increasingly uti-
lized to arrest many attempted class actions. This should be par-
ticularly true when the class is very large.
3. Civil Rights
Civil rights legislation is a rapidly developing area of federal
law under which consumer class actions may be brought without
regard to amount in controversy. Traditionally, the federal civil
rights laws have been utilized primarily to enforce constitutional
prohibitions against racial discrimination resulting from "state
action" by allowing complainants to bring class actions in federal
courts for equitable relief.00 Recently, however, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized the plight of lower class consumers
who have been victimized by state authorized, "legitimate" busi-
ness practices, such as prejudgment garnishment of wages'0' and
summary "claim and delivery" procedures.0 2 The utility of the
civil rights laws in asserting these consumer claims via class ac-
tions was recently upheld in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. °3
and a new era of civil rights litigation-deterrence of consumer
discrimination-was ushered in.
The controversy in Lynch centered around whether the civil
rights laws were to be construed as including only "personal
rights" or whether "property rights" should also be protected.
The plaintiff in Lynch was a consumer who sought to represent a
class seeking equitable relief against a finance corporation and
state officers for garnishing her savings account and attacking
other assets without a prior hearing but pursuant to state law.
The class representative sought federal jurisdiction under Section
1343 of Title 28, United States Code, which states in part:
99. Katarincic and McClain, Federal Class Actions Under Rule 23: How to Improve
the Merits of Your Class Actions Without Improving Your Claim, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 429
(1972).
100. See, e.g., Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966) and the civil
rights cases cited therein.
101. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
102. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
103. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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Section 1343. Civil Rights . . . .The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law...
commenced by any person:...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law,
statute, ordinance, custom or usage, of any right. . . secured
by the Constitution. . .or Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens .... "I
A three judge panel convened to hear the complaint but dis-
missed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 5 The
lower court held that the Civil Rights Act only protected "per-
sonal rights" and since the class representative's claim involved
primarily a "property right," the claim must be dismissed.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court in Lynch by
expressly rejecting the dichotomy between "personal" and "prop-
erty" rights under the federal civil rights laws.'0 The Court traced
the history of civil rights law in the United States and indicated
the practical necessity of protecting property rights as well as
personal rights. In pointing out that many civil rights claims
involve "mixed cases" where both personal and property rights
are involved, the Court stated that maintaining a distinction be-
tween these rights is a "virtual impossibility.'
0 7
The effect Lynch will have on the utilization of civil rights
legislation in consumer protection litigation remains to be seen.
It definitely opens a new door to the consumer, but the course is
yet uncharted. Prerequisites for the consumer civil rights class
action are that there must be some form of "state action," which
is discriminatorially applied to the consumer class without a ra-
tional basis, as opposed to the application of the same "state
action" to other groups or individuals. Even if these conditions
exist, other problems must be solved. Must the claimants be
recognized as "indigents," or can a middle class consumer allege
that the "custom and usage" of a particular business, operating
under state law, deprive the consumer of "equal protection"? In
such a situation, can the consumer automatically get into federal
court? Could such a consumer represent a class of similarly situ-
ated consumers? Even with the Lynch doctrine widening the
104. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1962).
105. 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970).
106. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 (1972).
107. Id. at 550-51.
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scope of civil rights protection, it is obvious there will be many
problems to solve before a consumer can readily proceed with a
class action under the civil rights laws.
One of the primary considerations of the consumer class rep-
resentative attempting to assert a claim under the civil rights
laws is which type relief will sufficiently satisfy the claim and
redress the harm alleged. This decision will largely dictate the
category of class action to be utilized and consequently, what
requirements of class action maintenance must be met.0 8 There
are many situations, as in Lynch, where equitable relief alone
may sufficiently satisfy the complaint of the consumer class. The
consumer class representative will normally prefer a monetary
remedy, however, to retain competent legal counsel and to
achieve the corrective impact monetary judgments have on the
defendant. 0' The Civil Rights Act specifically allows for recovery
of "damages . . . or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights. . ... "0 Therefore, the
only apparent problem for the class litigant seeking damages is
to find an appropriate federal civil rights law. The stalwart civil
rights law utilized for this purpose, as well as for equitable rem-
edy purposes, is section 1983, which creates civil liability for dep-
rivation of constitutional rights."'
The most widely cited civil rights consumer class action is a
pre-Lynch case, Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment,
in which the plaintiff class sought "various relief' under the Civil
Rights Act, as well as under securities fraud, antitrust and state
credit laws."2 The class in Contract Buyers League consisted of
minority home buyers who alleged that defendant home sellers
operated a scheme especially designed to profit from the plight
of the urban Black in securing adequate housing. Notwithstand-
ing the complex problems of fact and legal issues, the court found
the class action procedure was proper due to the overriding
predominance of key issues. Contract Buyers League is dis-
tinguishable from a "true" consumer class action since the class
consisted of a racial minotiry group and made a civil rights
108. See note 28 supra and the text accompanying.
109. Travers and Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. REV. 811, 822
(1970).
110. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(4) (1962) (emphasis added).
111. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1962).
112. 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Il1. 1969), aff'd, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970).
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claim even more appropriate. In light of the Lynch decision, how-
ever, it would seem that any class of abused consumers should be
able to proceed as the class in Contract Buyers did, even without
the racial discrimination undertones which permeated the
Contract Buyers case."
3
4. Consumer Credit Protection
While several other federal laws have been and are being
effectively utilized by consumers to combat consumer abuse, the
Consumer Protection Act of 1968"11 is the only federal law
specifically designed for consumer protection which allows pri-
vate action. The CCPA was designed to control and prevent con-
sumer abuse in the field of consumer finance-credit lending and
credit buying of consumer goods and services-by (1) encouraging
competition among dealers in the consumer credit trade and (2)
disclosing to the consumer the actual cost of borrowing or buying
on credit. To insure enforcement of its provisions regulating con-
sumer credit financing, the CCPA specifically provides civil lia-
bility for certain violations in addition to its provisions for admin-
istrative enforcement.
The CCPA has six titles. Title I provides for disclosure of
credit terms, the regulation of credit transactions, credit card
issuance and credit advertising. Title II provides for criminal
sanctions against the practice of extortionate credit transactions,
commonly called "loan sharking." Title Ill restricts the use of
garnishment procedures to maximum limits of consumer earn-
ings. Title IV provides for the establishment of a commission for
the continuing study of consumer finance problems. Title V is a
standard enabling provision. Title VI regulates the manner in
which consumer credit finance reporting is compiled and
disseminated and requires disclosure of personal information
upon the request of the consumer. Of the six titles under the
CCPA, only Title I and Title VI specifically provide for civil
action by the consumer debtor.
113. But see Bahom v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 55 F.R.D. 478
(W.D. La. 1972) which denied female telephone operators the right to maintain a class
action for monetary damages for alleged sex discrimination.
114. 82 Stat. 146 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C) (hereinafter
referred to as the CCPA).
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a. The Truth-In-Lending Act
Title I of the CCPA, referred to as the Truth-in-Lending Act
(hereafter the TIL), is subdivided into three chapters: Chapter
1-General Provisions; Chapter 2-Credit Transactons; and
Chapter 3-Credit Advertising. Of these three chapters, chapter
2 is the most important. Chapter 2 contains strict disclosure re-
quirements for credit transactions, and most importantly it con-
tains a provision allowing civil action in federal court for viola-
tions of certain disclosure requirements.115 Because of the private
right of action provided in section 130, this act has been the
source of nearly all consumer litigation under the CCPA.
One of the primary difficulties in interpreting the TIL in-
volves the extent of jurisdiction granted under section 130, which
states in part:
Civil Liability
(a) . . . (A)ny creditor who fails in connection with any con-
sumer credit transaction (otherwise defined in this chapter) to
disclose . . . any information required . . . is liable to (the
debtor) in an amount equal to the sum of
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge. . . (but in no
case) less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and
(2) in the case of successful action. . . a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as determined by the court.
(e) . . . Any action under this section may be brought in any
United States district court, or in any court of competent juris-
diction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the
violation.
While some litigants have attempted to have the courts apply
section 130 to other CCPA provisions, the courts have uniformly
limited the cause of action and grant of federal jurisdiction of
section 130 to chapter 2 of the TIL."6 There is some dispute,
however, within chapter 2 concerning the extent to which section
130 should be applicable. Some courts have interpreted section
115. Truth In Lending Act § 130(e); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(e) (Supp. 1972).
116. See, e.g., Oldham v. Oldham, 337 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (denying
private right of action against violators of garnishment restrictions under Title IM, Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act). See generally Stans, Continuing Complexities in Consumer
Class Actions, 49 J. URBAN LAW 349 (1971).
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130 as only allowing federal jurisdiction over disputes concerning
failure to comply with disclosure requirements.117 Other courts
have interpreted section 130 as allowing federal jurisdiction over
any of the "rights" granted to consumer debtors under chapter
2, including for example, the right to recission within three days
of the credit transaction."' Recently, one federal circuit court
dismissed a dispute over the extent of section 130's applicability
by allowing federal jurisdiction over all "private rights" under the
TIL through 23 U.S.C. §1337, which grants federal jurisdiction
over controversies arising under federal trade and commerce reg-
ulatory statutes.' 9 Whether this decision renders the jurisdic-
tional portion of Section 130 superfluous depends upon the ac-
ceptance of this application by other courts. The full impact of
28 U.S.C. §1337 will be considered in greater detail in the next
part of this note.'20
Because of the technical complexities of the disclosure re-
quirements in "consumer credit transactions" under the TIL and
difficulties encountered by creditors in complying with them,
Section 130 has provided consumer class litigants with numerous
opportunities to seek redress in the federal courts. Cases for con-
sumer class damages under the TIL abound, with many suits
seeking to recover enormous fees for very minor disclosure in-
fractions. The temptation for "bounty hunting-consumer pro-
tecting" attorneys has been too inviting for resistance, and con-
sequently the Rule 23(b)(3) class action for TIL violations has
rapidly "fallen into disrepute in the courts. 1 2' These consumer
class "strike suits" have led to the emergence of special restrictive
interpretations of Rule 23 for consumer class actions, interpreta-
tions which may render them virtually useless under the TIL.
The leading case restricting class actions under the TIL is
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.'2 2 It is most signifi-
cant that the Ratner decision was written by Judge Marvin E.
Frankel, sitting in the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York. Judge Frankel has long been a respected
authority on the Rule 23 class action and had adopted at an early
117. See, e.g., Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
118. See, e.g., Ganza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
119. Sosa v. Fite, 465 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1972).
120. See note 172 infra and the text accompanying.
121. See note 9 supra and the text accompanying.
122. 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
1973]
35
Driggers: Consumer Class Actions under Federal Rule 23: Consumer Protection
Published by Scholar Commons, 1973
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
date, an optimistically cautious attitude toward Rule 23. He
acknowledged the rule's social value, while remaining wary of its
potential for abuse.'1 The Southern District of New York Court
is a gold mine of class action precedent, that district court having
heard an amazing number of class action suits.' 24
The highly technical issue in Ratner was whether the TIL
required the disclosure by the defendant bank of a "nominal an-
nual percentage rate" of interest on open end credit billing, even
though no finance charges had been assessed. The class repre-
sentative sought to represent as many as 130,000 of the
defendant bank's consumer-customers who, as members of the
bank's "Master-Charge Credit Card Plan," had received finan-
cial statements omitting the "annual percentage rate." The
bank's position, supported by a staff opinion letter from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, 2 5 was that no "annual percentage rate" was
required until a chargeable balance existed in the customer's
unpaid account. Both Ratner litigants requested the court to
make a preliminary decision on the merits of the TIL claims
before deciding whether the class action could be maintained.
The Ratner court concurred with the request of the parties
and temporarily postponed for a later hearing the issue of whether
the class action could be maintained. This postponement was a
significant recognition by the parties and the court of the desira-
bility of precluding, when possible, the costs and complexities of
notifying the class members. 25 Turning to the merits of the
123. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39 (1967), wherein Judge Frankel stated:
I think we may venture to hope that the fears of such weighty dissenters will
prove to have been unfounded. While there is much novelty and room for doubt
in the new Rule, it is, by the same token, a mandate to adopt judicial procedure
to constantly changing, increasingly complex patterns of litigation.
124. See, e.g., Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
375, 377 (1972) commenting on the American College of Trial Lawyers, Report & Recom-
mendations of the Special Committee on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1972) as follows:
The Trial Lawyers Study is the only available statistical study on class actions
.... It shows that from 1967 to 1971 the number of class actions filed in the
Southern District of New York increased four-fold. And more than 53% of the
actions commenced in 1966 were still pending in 1971.
125. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also Garwood, Truth-In-Lending After Two Years, 89 BANK L.J. 3 (1972) wherein the
Ratner court's rejection of the "staff opinion letter" from the Federal Reserve Board is
criticised by the author of the letter.
126. Compare the Ratner court's postponement of the class action issue with Dolgow
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Ratner complaint, Judge Frankel found that the complaint was
valid, based on his interpretation of the TIL and the underlying
purpose of the laws to "put the borrower on notice before the
plunge.",
2
Immediately following the initial determination of the TIL
violation by the defendant-bank in the first Ratner opinion,
waves of shock hit the consumer finance industry. Early fears of
massive damages from class action judgments based on minor
technical violations of the TIL had apparently materialized.
Judge Frankel, however, after nearly seven months of hearings,
deliberation and consideration, decided the consumer class ac-
tion for damages was not maintainable.' 28 Judge Frankel based
his denial of the class action on a new doctrine developed in the
TIL class action cases. When a statute allows an adequate rem-
edy within its own provisions, this doctrine states that the Rule
23(b)(3) category of class actions cannot meet the test of "superi-
ority" of actions. Supporting his decision, Judge Frankel pointed
out there was no "affirmative need" for the class action procedure
and that aggregation of the fines, under the class action proce-
dure, "would carry to an absurd and stultifying extreme" the
remedy designed by Congress, since the class would have been
entitled to as much as $13,000,000.
In summarizing his decision against the class action, Judge
Frankel stated:
[Rule 23 calls] for the exercise of some considerable discretion
of a pragmatic nature. Appealing to that kind of judgment,
defendant points out that (1) the incentive of class action bene-
fits is unnecessary in view of the [TIL's] provisions for [fines,
costs and attorney's fees] and (2) the proposed recovery . . .
would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment unre-
lated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit of
the defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable
violation of the [TIL]. These points are cogent and persuasive
[T]he allowance of this [action] as a class action is essentially
inconsistent with the specific remedy supplied by Congress and
employed by plaintiff in this case. It is not fairly possible...
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), requiring a pretrial showing by the plaintiff-
class representative's substantial probability of success.
127. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
128. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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to find the [Rule 23(b)(3)] form of class action "superior to"
[the TIL remedy].'29
The Ratner doctrine prohibiting TIL class actions has ren-
dered a devastating, if not fatal, blow to the aspirations of those
heralding consumer class actions under the TIL.30 The consid-
ered and experienced view of Judge Frankel has been quite influ-
ential in other courts.
The inherent difficulties courts have always experienced
with class actions, coupled with the abuses of the class action by
attorneys representing the class, will undoubtedly accelerate the
demise of the TIL consumer class action under the Ratner doc-
trine. At a time when class actions of every imaginable type are
crowding the court's dockets, the Ratner doctrine has given the
courts a logical, legal rationale for dismissing class actions.,3'
b. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
As previously mentioned, in addition to Title I, Title VI of
the CCPA provides for civil liability and federal jurisdiction over
claims against consumer credit institutions for violations of its
regulatory provisions. Title VI, referred to as the "Fair Credit
Reporting Act" [hereafter the FCRA], allows private action
whenever a "consumer reporting agency or user" thereof will-
fully I12 or negligently 33 fails to act "with fairness, impartiality
and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy" '34 while compil-
ing and reporting consumer credit information. Prior to the
FCRA, the consumer had no access to information concerning his
own credit status, and haphazard practices by consumer report-
ing agencies had caused unwarranted denials of credit to numer-
ous consumers. Because of the personal nature of the abuse to
129. Id. at 416. The court, nonetheless, awarded the plaintiff $100 for the fine, plus
$20,000 attorney's fees.
130. It is interesting to compare the logic behind the Ratner decision with the ration-
ale the courts apply in allowing class actions in antitrust and securities fraud. The anti-
trust and securities fraud statutory schemes are remarkably similar to that of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, but the courts seem to have an aversion to the consumer
credit debtor, while embracing the antitrust and securities fraud litigant.
131. See Shields v. The Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., CCH CONS. CRED. Gum 99,195
(D.C. Ariz. April 24, 1972); and see Shields v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., CCH CONS. CRED.
GUIDE 99,183 (D.C. Ariz. June 5, 1972).
132. Fair Credit Reporting Act, § 616, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n (Supp. 1972).
133. Id. § 617; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681o (Supp. 1972).
134. Id. § 602; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m (Supp. 1972).
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which the FCRA addresses itself, it does not seem likely that a
violation would be adaptable to the class action form without
extensive and costly discovery procedures for establishing abuse
to a defined class. In any event, the Ratner doctrine,
denying class actions, may be applicable to any attempted class
action under the FCRA since the FCRA contains provision for
actual and punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's
fees.13
5
5. Minor Federal Statutes
The adaptability of various federal statutes to the class ac-
tion procedure has been demonstrated by successful class actions
under such diverse statutes as the Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act'3' and the National Environmental Policy Act.' 37 In an
effort to find new remedies for consumer abuse, commentators
have examined new federal statutes and have even suggested new
applications for some obscure statutes for possible use in con-
sumer class actions. Unfortunately, attempts to "discover"
causes of action adaptable to the consumer class action under
these minor statutes have not been successful.
One recently passed federal statute, the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1971, provides consumers with a private right of action
for willful or negligent noncompliance with the Act's require-
ments for price controls.' 3' Section 210 of the Act allows any con-
sumer "suffering from any act or practice [to] bring action
in any District Court of the United States, without regard to
amount in controversy" for equitable or legal relief.'3' Interest-
ingly, the Act provides fines for willful violations, but does not
provide similar fines for negligent violations. This situation would
apparently allow consumer class actions for negligent violations,
while the Ratner doctrine would deny a class action for willful
135. Id. §§ 616 and 617, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681n and 1681o, provide for actual dam-
ages, costs and reasonable attorney's fees. § 616 also provides for punitive damages for
"willful noncompliance." § 618, 15 U.S.C.A. § 168 1p, provides for federal jurisdiction
over claims brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
136. Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
137. Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
138. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1909 (Supp. 1972). See Herman, Private Suits for Over-
charges Under the Economic Stabilization Act, 39 U. Cm. L. Rav. 295 (1972) which
provides excellent instructions on how to proceed with a private action under the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act.
139. § 210(a), 85 Stat. 743 (1971).
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violations. The anomaly created by these provisions of the Act,
when the Ratner doctrine is applied, would probably be overcome
by the exercise of judicial discretion, in a dismissal of the class
action as being inconsistent with the purpose of the Act whether
the alleged violation is willful or negligent. Consequently, the
consumer class representative is not likely to find a convenient
vehicle for litigation in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1971.
One example of an innovative attempt to utilize an existing
federal law to attack a consumer abuse involved the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946 [hereafter the LTA].4 0 Although the
LTA was clearly designed to prevent unfair competition between
commercial businesses, the provision of the LTA allowing for
private action in federal court is worded as follows:
Section 43(a)-Any person who shall affix, apply or annex, or
use in connection with any goods or services, or any container
or containers for goods, a false description or
representation, . . .and shall cause such goods and services to
enter commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of
the falsity ...cause or procure the same to be ...used in
commerce ...shall be liable to a civil action by any person
doing business . . . or any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by use of such false description or
representation.'
Section 43(a) was "discovered" and suggested for reactivation as
a consumer protector since it appeared, on its face, to provide the
consumer with a device to combat consumer fraud."'
Accordingly, in 1971, a consumer action was brought under
the LTA for alleged deceit and false advertising by a ski-tour
service in Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd. 14 The
lower court dismissed the class action for failure to state an ac-
tionable claim. In affirming, the circuit court extensively dis-
cussed the purpose of the LTA, rejecting the view of the consumer
class representatives that the LTA should be used to redress con-
sumer abuse. Furthermore, the court mildly chastised the con-
140. 60 Stat. 427 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.).
141. Id. § 43(a); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (1963) (emphasis added).
142. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 1. Considerations of Equity, 49 Bos.
U.L. REV. 211, 239 (1969).
143. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972).
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sumer class representatives for their attempt to expand the LTA
and recommended that they utilize available local remedies."'
There are new statutes, such as the Consumer Product
Safety Act of 1972,145 which may allow limited consumer protec-
tion in the form of class actions and other old statutes, besides
the Lanham Act, susceptable of broad interpretations allowing
consumer actions. However, restrictive rules, exemplified by the
Ratner and Colligan decisions, reflect growing judicial impati-
ence with the Rule 23 class action procedure for consumer protec-
tion, which may preclude any new consumer remedies. The best
prospect for advances in the field of consumer litigation lies in the
passage of new legislation specifically allowing consumer class
actions.
6. State Law and the Doctrine of "Pendent Jurisdiction"
As previously mentioned in connection with securities
fraud,' the single most abusive conduct perpetrated against con-
sumers as a class is consumer fraud. Consumer fraud encompas-
ses all deceptive consumer trade practices, including such com-
mon activities as product misrepresentation and false advertis-
ing. 47 This abuse has never been effectively countered, either in
common law or statutory law. There has traditionally existed a
laissez-faire philosophy of caveat emptor in the consumer trade
industry that is partially based on the ideals of "rugged individu-
alism," "Yankee ingenuity" and "the free enterprise system."
144. Id. at 693.
145. Pub. L. No. 92-573 (Oct. 28, 1972), 41 U.S.L.W. 57 (Oct. 31, 1972). § 23(a) of
the Consumer Product Safety Act allows "Suits for Damages By Persons Injured," but
only when there is a $10,000 "amount in controversy" claim. Consumers are not, however,
limited in common law actions available locally prior to passage of the new law. § 24
provides for "Private Enforcement of Product Safety Rules and Orders" required by the
Act by any "interested person." Such an "interested person" may recover reasonable
attorney's fees and costs, if successful.
146. See the discussion on Securities Fraud supra.
147. See generally Dole, The Emergence of Deceptive Advertising as a Group Tort:
A Possible Consequence of the 1966 Federal Rule Amendment With Respect to Class
Actions, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 661 (1967); Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 OaE.
L. Rev. 21 (1970); Leete, The Right of Consumers to Bring Class Actions in the Federal
Courts-An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 39 (1971); Stans, The
Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 Bos. U.L. REv. 407
(1969); Note, Consumers, Class Actions and Costs: An Economic Perspective on Deceptive
Advertising, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 592 (1971); Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1965).
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However, modern complexities in consumer products and
purchasing contracts, and the use by the consumer trade industry
of advanced advertising and marketing techniques, along with
the disabling impact consumer fraud has on the modern con-
sumer, have called for the rejection of earlier anti-consumer phi-
losophies."'
Except in a few progressive states, state common law and
statutes fall far short of granting an adequate remedy to consum-
ers.' Actions at common law in deceit or fraud generally re-
quire extensive elements of proof-misrepresentation of material
facts, reliance, causal connection-which are often difficult to
prove. Additionally, the damage to the individual consumer is
relatively small. Therefore, without an effective class action de-
vice which can be utilized by "small claimants," the common law
remedies are useless. To meet the demands for consumer action,
several states have adopted laws which allow private action for
consumer abuse and laws which allow small claim class actions. 5 "
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act was especially de-
signed for adoption by all states and contains provisions to com-
bat consumer fraud.' Unfortunately, however, only a few states
have adopted such progressive legislation and even where
legislation exists the courts have been loath to allow consumer
class actions, California being a significant exception. 2
Even if an adequate state remedy for consumer abuse ex-
isted, there would be the possibility of having the issue heard in
federal court under the doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction." This
discretionary doctrine allows federal jurisdiction over state claims
when the "common nucleus of operative facts" upon which the
federal claim is based is also justification for alleging a state
claim.'53 The doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction" may be utilized
148. The synthesis of decisions of products liability in tort law seems compellingly
analogous. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS, Products Liability §§ 96-104
(4th ed. 1971).
149. See, e.g., Dear v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732 (1967).
150. See, e.g., Hamburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L.
REv. 609 (1971).
151. See, e.g., Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1101.
152. Compare Hall v. Cobum Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720 (1970)
(dismissing a consumer class action brought under the state's Retail Installment Sales
Act) with Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964 (1971) (allowing a
consumer class action for fraud in connection with an installment contract plan).
153. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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to allow federal jurisdiction over state claims even when the ac-
companying federal claim has been dismissed and has been so
utilized in consumer class actions under the Truth In Lending
Act. One example of this is seen in the case of Garland v. Mobile
Oil Corp.'54 in which the consumer class representative brought
his claim for damages and equitable relief in federal district court
under both the TIL and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act. The Garland court dismissed the claim under the
TIL, holding that the TIL did not require disclosure of a "late
payment charge." Since there was a possible claim under the
state statute, the court maintained jurisdiction over the case and
directed a pre-trial conference on the state claim.
Although the problem did not exist in Garland, since Illinois
allows class actions in her state courts,'5 an interesting technical
problem may exist in the situation in which the consumer claim-
ant has a valid state claim, but the state does not allow class
actions. Should the federal court exercise the "pendent jurisdic-
tion" over a consumer class action brought in federal court joined
with a faulty federal claim if the state does not allow class ac-
tions? The answer would turn on whether the court viewed the
state position on class actions as procedural or substantive. Al-
though it would seem that the question is merely a matter of
procedure and the federal court could apply its own rules, diffi-
cult questions regarding procedural vis-a-vis substantive law
have been raised in the federal courts since Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, '56 and the answer to such a problem would be difficult
to predict.
Although there is a possibility of bringing a state consumer
claim under federal jurisdiction through the doctrine of "pendent
jurisdiction," this possibility can hardly be considered a solution
to the problem of consumer abuse. In effect, the doctrine does
little more than act as a boon to claimants who can satisfy their
claim in state court without going into federal court, while the
claimant residing in a state which has not provided for consumer
action is no better off. Furthermore, since the exercise of "pen-
dent jurisdiction" is purely discretionary, there is no reason to
expect the federal courts to exercise their discretion uniformly in
154. 340 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. li. 1972).
155. 110 ILL. REV. STAT. § 23 (1968).
156. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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favor of consumer class action claims when such claims are both
burdensome and complicated. Indeed, the federal courts at an
early date established a tradition of avoiding such "local mat-
ters" as consumer fraud for fear of opening a "Pandora's Box" of
difficulties.'57 Therefore, the doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction"
will be of little value in consumer class litigation, absent the
court's acceptance of a meritless federal claim, brought solely for
the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction. The likelihood of
such an event is, of course, minimal.
7. The "Doctrine of Implication" and 28 U.S.C. § 1337:
A Viable Alternative?
When Congress has enacted legislation designed to protect
consumers, which does not specifically grant a federal cause of
action, the problem arises whether such legislation implies a pri-
vate right in the face of continued and unabated consumer abuse.
Generally, the scheme of consumer protection legislation is for
enforcement by federal agencies. Congress has enacted many laws
and has created numerous agencies to aid consumers in the food
and drug, trade practices, environmental protection and safe
products areas. However, frequent demonstrations of the failure
or inability of federal agencies in effectively carrying out the pur-
pose of these laws has emphasized the need for the "small claim-
ant" consumer class action to enforce consumer protection. The
classic example of inaction by a federal agency is, of course, the
Holland Furnace Co. cases where the Federal Trade Commission
spent thirty years prosecuting one defendant for unfair trade
practices against consumers.' 8 In fairness to the FTC, it should
be noted that recently its activity in consumer protection has
increased both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, agency
inaction still exists due to the practical impossibility of regulating
all abusive practices.
Absent clear statutory authorization for private action,
should the federal courts allow class actions to come to the aid of
the "small claimant"-consumer class when the federal agency
charged with the responsibility has not acted? While there is no
definitive answer to this question, there are several noteworthy
157. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
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examples in which the federal courts have granted private rights
under federal law when no private right is specifically allowed.
The most widely recognized federal cause of action in this
situation is, of course, the right to private action under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1"' This federal statute, while not
granting a specific private action, has been a prolific source of
private class suits for securities fraud, as previously discussed.
The rationale justifying private action has been that without pri-
vate rights of action this statute will go unenforced except to the
limited extent of enforcement through the Securities Exchange
Commission.'60
Another example of private action under regulatory statutes
not specifically allowing such action was recently articulated by
the United States Supreme Court. In Allen v. State Board of
Elections, the Court allowed private action in federal court under
the "doctrine of implication" where federal administrative action
had been insufficient to redress the wrong suffered by the claim-
ant. ' Although the Allen case did not involve a consumer class
action, it should be seriously considered for possible utility by the
consumer class litigant.
In Allen, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could pro-
ceed under a provision of a federal regulatory act, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, although private remedy was not specifically
granted in the Act. The Allen case is clearly distinguishable from
the consumer class action seeking pecuniary relief since it was a
civil rights case and the remedy sought was an injunction against
alleged racial discrimination. The Supreme Court's allowance of
the action in Allen, however, was premised on the regulatory
nature of the federal act, which the Court felt was indicative of
Congress' implied intent to allow private action:
The achievement of the Act's laudable goal could be severly
hampered, however, if each citizen were required to depend
solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney
General .... [T]he provisions of the Act extend to the States
and the subdivisions thereof. The Attorney General has a lim-
ited staff and often might be unable to uncover quickly new
regulations and enactments .... "I
159. See, e.g., J.S. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), where the Supreme Court
allowed a private action for damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order
to effectuate "congressional purpose."
160. See, e.g., L. Loss, supra, note 79 at 1819.
161. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
162. Id. at 556.
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As inviting to consumer class litigation as the Allen "doctrine
of implication" may seem, it was refused application in consumer
class suits in the case of Holloway v. Bristol-Myers.6 3 In
Holloway, the class representatives brought an action under the
Federal Trade Commission Act for the alleged deceptive trade
practice of falsely advertising defendant's product, "Excedrin."
The F.T.C. Act does not authorize civil action, but the class
representatives raised interesting arguments favoring private ac-
tion, and stated that the purpose of the Federal Act was to protect
consumers from these acts, that the Federal Trade Commission
had failed to act, and finally that the Supreme Court had author-
ized civil action under regulatory acts through the Allen "doc-
trine of implication." The Holloway court, however, held that the
court was without jurisdiction, because the F.T.C. Act does not
grant specific civil remedy. This fact, the court pointed out, was
known to Congress which had several bills in committee purport-
ing to amend the F.T.C. Act to allow consumer class actions. 6 '
With regard to the "doctrine of implication," the Holloway court
restricted its application to the situation existent in the Allen
case. "'65
Notwithstanding the Holloway court's rejection of the "doc-
trine of implication," it would seem that the consumer class liti-
gant may yet be able to utilize the doctrine effectively when the
consumer abuse and federal agency inaction are both acute. The
doctrine arose in the midst of wide public and judicial concern
over civil rights and at a time when the tremendous pressures
being applied to federal agencies authorized to enforce civil rights
laws rendered them unable to prosecute every violation. It would
seem that the same climate presently exists in the field of con-
sumer protection litigation, and the "doctrine of implication"
might yet be accepted by the courts.'66 Unfortunately, other ob-
stacles in consumer class litigation, as the manageability of large
consumer classes and the impact of large amounts of damages on
163. 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971).
164. Id. at 20.
165. Id. at 21. The Holloway court also distinguished the application of J.S. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains a
broad, indefinite federal jurisdiction granting provision-15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa, whereas
the Federal Trade Commission Act has no comparable provision. 327 F. Supp. at 21-22.
166. See generally Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) and Ha-
waii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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consumer class defendants, may preclude the courts from ever
allowing the "doctrine of implication" to apply to consumer class
actions.
Even if one assumes the court's acceptance of the "doctrine
of implication" for purposes of providing the consumer class liti-
gant with a cause of action under federal regulatory statutes, the
question of federal jurisdiction may persist. To insure that the
court will not dismiss the action for lack of federal jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the recognized cause of action, the consumer
class representative may be able to utilize Section 1337 of Title
28, United States Code, which states:
§ 1337. Commerce and anti-trust regulations.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress
regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against
restraints and monopolies.
The full impact of section 1337 on consumer class actions is not
certain, but a partial analysis may be made from the existing
cases.
Under normal civil actions, meaning those actions other than
class actions, section 1337 has been construed to allow private
action under federal regulatory statutes which do not provide for
the specific action sought but do at least imply a "right" of such
action. 6' Since section 1337 does not alone constitute a cause of
action, some other federal statute expressly or impliedly allowing
a private right of action must be utilized in conjunction with it.
Some courts have indicated that section 1337 should only apply
where federal law has preempted state law'68 or where all adminis-
trative remedies have been fully exhausted.' 9 Nevertheless, a
plain meaning interpretation of section 1337 appears to grant
federal jurisdiction for civil action, by individuals or class actions,
under all commerce, trade and antitrust regulatory laws to which
the "doctrine of implication" might be applied.
Two recent cases have considered section 1337 in consumer
actions. The first case was Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. involving
167. See, e.g., Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. A.T.&T., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
168. See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 437 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1970).
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an antitrust action by a state as parens patriae for damages
suffered to the state's general economy caused by the alleged
unlawful conspiracies and monopolistic practices of the defen-
dant.'70 While interpreting the antitrust treble damages statute
as not including damage to a state's economy, the Court offered
the following advice to the state concerning the right of private
"small claim" suits, absent the permissability of parens patriae
representation by the state:
Congress has given private citizens rights of action for in-
junctive relief and damages for antitrust violations without re-
gard to amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1337; 15 U.S.C.
§ 15. Rule 23. . . provides for class actions which may enhance
the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine
their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation
posture. ' '
The Hawaii Court declared that a state could, in "certain circum-
stances," properly maintain a class action. However, the Court
clearly indicated its preference for the privately maintained class
suit, pointing to the attraction of attorney's fees in consumer class
antitrust litigation and to the clear guidelines of Rule 23 as op-
posed to the undelineated parens patriae action.
The second recent case which considered the applicability of
section 1337 to consumer class actions was the federal circuit
court case of Sosa v. Fite.Y12 Sosa was an action by a debtor who
sought to rescind a consumer credit transaction because of the
creditor's failure to make certain disclosures required by the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act of 1968. The lower court dismissed
the action because it thought state law preempted the CCPA and
because of the lack of federal jurisdiction based on the court's
narrow interpretation of the CCPA's jurisdictional reach.13 The
circuit court, in a brief opinion, rejected the lower court's view
that the state law preempted the CCPA and held that federal
jurisdiction was properly requested. After alluding to the prob-
lems of determining the extent of the CCPA's provision specifi-
cally granting federal jurisdiction over consumer credit transac-
170. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
171. Id. at 266.
172. 465 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1972).
173. Id. See note 115 supra and text accompanying for discussion of federal jurisdic-
tional problems under the Truth-In-Lending Act.
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tions, the court refused to decide the jurisdictional dispute based
on that provision since the claimant had originally invoked sec-
tion 1337. In deciding that federal jurisdiction was properly ob-
tained under section 1337, the Sosa court stated:
[S]ection [1337] provides that the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress regulating commerce. . . [The CCPA] was the re-
sult of an exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. . . . Further there can be no question that the "arising
under" tests are met. Sosa's claim is a direct assertion of a
federal statutory right .... 174
The future of section 1337 and the utility of the "doctrine of
implication" in consumer class actions remains to be seen. It
seems clear that section 1337 can properly be utilized in antitrust
and consumer credit cases where the federal regulatory laws
clearly create a right of private action. More uncertain are the
regulatory statutes, like the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which do not expressly create private rights, but in which private
rights can readily be implied in order to enhance the enforcement
of the law. The acceptance of the "doctrine of implication" cou-
pled with federal jurisdiction under section 1337 would eliminate
the difficult problem faced by the consumer class litigant ad-
dressing consumer abuses as deceptive trade practices and false
advertising. The ambiguities inherent in applying these devices,
however, would create many judicial problems, and the need for
clear, definitive guidelines set by specific statutory rules contin-
ues to exist.
SUMMARY
By way of disclaimer, it is necessary to admonish the pro-
spective consumer class representative and his counsel that the
foregoing discussion of the technical requirements of Rule 23 class
actions and the problems of the consumer class representative in
finding an actionable claim under federal law is by no means
totally comprehensive. Many problems concerning class action
procedure were not discussed: there may be difficulties in the
maintenance of the class action after the initial acceptance of the
class action procedure; notice problems of great dimension exist
under Rule 23 and are yet unresolved; and problems of proof of
damages and subsequent distribution of damages to class mem-
bers have not been uniformly treated in the courts. It would be
174. 465 F.2d at 1229.
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virtually impossible to make an exhaustive list of problems which
may occur in class actions. Hopefully, some of the more impor-
tant problems and considerations were discussed, giving the
reader some insight into the complexities of consumer class ac-
tions and perhaps providing a starting point for the aspiring con-
sumer protector, anxiously awaiting his day in court.
While there are many critics of the consumer class action
who believe the Rule 23 class action has shifted from a rule of
compensation to a rule of confiscation, there is much evidence to
show the desirability of consumer class actions due to the failure
of regulatory schemes at the local and national levels. The plain
facts are that consumer abuse exists and is practiced by large,
"legitimate" members of the consumer trade industry, as well as
by "fly-by-night" operators. Furthermore, current regulatory
statutes are largely ineffective in aiding consumers due to prob-
lems inherent in administrative action. Effective private action
would do much toward curbing consumer abuse at all levels of the
consumer trade industry.
Regretfully, the current trend in the courts is to restrict the
use of consumer class actions in which the class and damages
sought are very large. This restriction is purportedly intended to
prohibit "unwarranted, malicious actions against 'legitimate'
consumer trade businesses." Ironically, this trend may be estab-
lishing an inequitable rule, favoring defendants in large consumer
class actions in that "the larger the crime, the easier the escape."
Hastening the acceptance of restrictive rules for consumer class
actions are the frequent attempts by attorneys to utilize the con-
sumer class action to generate large fees. The courts, however,
should be able to fashion reasonable tests to guard against con-
sumer "strike suits," while allowing truly meritorious class ac-
tions. In the traditional antitrust and securities regulations class
suits, long accepted as necessary for enforcement of federal regu-
latory laws, the courts have learned to recognize and distinguish
malicious from worthy claims.
There, of course, remains the problem of finding a federal
cause of action available for consumer protection from such
abuses as consumer fraud. The answer would seem to lie in allow-
ance of a private action, suitable for class actions, under the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The demand for new legislation
is great and it may be forthcoming soon. Until then, however, the
aggrieved consumer will continue to make imaginative attempts
[Vol. 25
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to "conjure up" remedies under existing law. Regardless of what
new law may be passed, the consumer class action will continue
to be a curious creature of the law which will be observed, praised
and condemned by countless commentators to come.
MARTIN S. DRIGGERS
APPENDIX: RULE 23. CLASS ACTION
(a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more members
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interest of the class.
(b) CLASS ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action may be main-
.tained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against indi-
vidual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompat-
ible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their inter-
ests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making ap-
propriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members, and that a class action is supe-
rior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
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controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) DETERMINATION BY ORDER WHETHER CLASS ACTION TO BE
MAINTAINED; NOTICE; JUDGMENT; ACTIONS CONDUCTED PARTIALLY
AS CLASS ACTIONS.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this
subdivision may be conditional and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)
(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court
will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified
date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
to be members of the class. The judgment in an action main-
tained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those
to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed,
and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or
(B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.
(d) ORDERS IN CONDUCT OF ACTIONS. In the conduct of ac-
tions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing
[Vol. 25
52
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss2/9
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the pres-
entation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection
of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may
direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or
of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair
and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or
otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the
representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to
representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed
accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The
orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may
be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. A class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
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